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Yun-Hsien Diana Lin*
The process of legal modernization in Taiwan began in 1895, when the
Japanese colonial government first imposed westernized modern law on
Taiwan. Before 1895, the code of imperial Ch’ing—deeply influenced by
the Confucian legal culture which emphasized social harmony and was
opposed to lawsuits—had been the state law for more than two centuries.
A second major transition started in the 1920s, during which Taiwanese
people gradually became accustomed to accessing modern courts for their
civil disputes, and the number of civil lawsuits eventually surpassed that
of cases under mediation. The positive attitude toward civil litigation
continued after the Nationalist government retreated to Taiwan in 1949.
As a historical coincidence, the Nationalists also applied German- and
Japanese-style legal codes in Taiwan, including double tracks of town
mediation and family court mediation. Besides addressing this “lawversus-custom” dichotomy, the following article concerns itself mainly
with the continuing and ever-evolving process of dialectic and mutual
resistance between the different legal orders.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The history of the law in Taiwan can be traced back to multiple
sources, which contribute to its diversified and hybrid legal culture.
Before the Westerners occupied part of Taiwan in the 17th century,1 the
majority inhabitants of Taiwan were aboriginal people who have long
applied tribal laws for dispute resolution. Most aboriginal laws and
customs were passed by word of mouth. Each Taiwanese tribe had a chief
who was often chosen by his bloodline and who was responsible for the
arbitration of tribal disputes.2 In 1624, the Netherlands established a
defensive Castle in Anping as her colonial capital under the auspices of
the United East India Company. In need of laborers, the Dutch had begun
to import Han Chinese workers from southeast China since 1630, many of
whom settled and thus brought traditional Chinese laws and customs to

1

In 1624, the Dutch built a commercial base in southern Taiwan called Anping; and in
1626, the Spanish landed on and occupied northern Taiwan in Keelong and Tamsui so as
to extend foreign trade. The Spanish rule ended in 1642 while the Dutch colonial period
lasted until 1662. Since the Spanish stayed for only 16 years and limited their control to
northern Taiwan, this article focuses more on the island’s occupation by the Netherlands,
who later controlled the south, north and east of Taiwan for 38 years.
2
Tay-Sheng Wang, Chapter 4: Taiwan, in ASIAN LEGAL SYSTEMS: LAW, SOCIETY AND
PLURALISM IN EAST ASIA 158–61 (Poh-Ling Tan ed., 1997).
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Taiwan.3 The Dutch colonists maintained a system of legal pluralism: a
Court of Justice was established for adjudication of disputes involving
Europeans, where Dutch law would apply; if the case concerned
Taiwanese aboriginals, the chief or elders of the tribe would arbitrate in
accordance with tribal laws and customs; and if disagreements were
among Han Chinese immigrants, the customs of the Han people would
prevail.4 Generally, the three types of law coexisted in harmony during
the 38 years of Dutch rule.
The Chinese regime in Taiwan was first established when Cheng
Chenggong, also known as Koxinga, led naval ships from southeast China
and drove away the Dutch in 1662.5 The Cheng regime controlled Taiwan
for 22 years until imperial Ch’ing took over.6 During the 212 years of
Ch’ing rule, traditional Chinese law became the dominant legal culture in
Taiwan. 7 One important reason was the increase of Han Chinese
population between 1680 and 1892: as recorded in historical documents
the Han population grew by a factor of 10, to 250 million, while the
Taiwanese aborigines became a minority in Taiwan.8 The other reason
lies in assimilation: as commercial and cultural exchange between ethnic
groups occurred, many aboriginal tribes assimilated to Han culture and
even adopted Han identities.9 As a result, although traditional Chinese
law is not the only element that shaped Taiwan’s legal culture, it is
without doubt the most influential one.
This article examines the process of legal modernization in
Taiwan and its implications for civil mediation. To understand the context
of civil mediation in Taiwan, the next part presents four aspects of
traditional Chinese legal culture based on Confucian thought. Part III
focuses on Taiwan’s first contact with westernized laws. It explores
possible reasons for the increase in civil litigation until it surpassed civil
mediation during the Japanese colonial period. Part IV discusses town
mediation after 1949 and its differences from prior systems with the same
name. Taiwan’s latest developments in family court mediation are also
introduced. Part V looks at the interaction between westernized state law

3

YONG-HE CAO, TAIWAN ZAOQI LISHI YANJIU [EARLY-PERIOD TAIWAN HISTORICAL
STUDIES] 61–65 (1979).
4
TAY-SHENG WANG, TAIWAN FALÜ SHI GAILUN [GENERAL DISCUSSION ON TAIWANESE
LEGAL HISTORY] 27 (2004).
5
WANG, supra note 2, at 266–67.
6
Following the defeat of Koxinga’s grandson in 1683 by the Qing Dynasty, Taiwan was
formally annexed by a Chinese regime and was placed under the jurisdiction of Fujian
province.
7
WANG, supra note 4, at 33.
8
SHAO-SHIN CHEN, TAIWAN DE REN KO BIEN CHIEN YÜ SHE HUI BIEN CHIEN
[DEMOGRAPHIC AND SOCIAL TRANSITIONS IN TAIWAN] 379–81 (1979).
9
WANG, supra note 4, at 33.
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and traditional customs from the perspective of legal pluralism. Part VI
concludes.

II. THE CONFUCIAN INFLUENCES ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE
ANTI-LAWSUIT ATTITUDE, LAW AS PUNISHMENT,
COLLECTIVISM AND FAMILY-CENTERED ETHICS
The Confucian tradition is often noted as an important factor in
understanding many East Asian societies, such as South Korea, China and
Taiwan. Founded by Confucius, Confucianism was not viewed merely as
a valuable stream of philosophy, but was incorporated as part of the
everyday life of Chinese people. 10 Indeed, it may be that because
Confucianism thus exists in a less visible and more diffuse state, it is
exerting an unconscious and therefore more powerful influence on
people’s lives.11 Clifford Geertz defines culture as the fabric of meaning
in terms of which human beings interpret their experience and guide their
action.12 On this view, law is also a part of culture, for to be meaningful
to the people it regulates the law must partake of the resources within the
culture.13 To that extent, Confucianism may influence legal discourse
because legal meaning largely depends on cultural signs and narrative.14
In contrast to the general agreement that Confucianism is still an
important part of East Asian societies, there is little agreement as to what
Confucianism means or which elements of East Asian culture are
attributable to Confucianism. Many things commonly counted as part of
the Confucian legacy, such as family centered ethics, respect for elders
and social harmony can also be described as attributes of many other
cultures in different areas of the world and in different historical periods.
Chaihark Hahm therefore argues that, while similar culture attributes can
be found in other places, the way in which they are combined to form a
“package” reveals the unique nature of Confucianism in East Asian
culture. 15 In order to draw up some abstract character traits from
Confucian culture, it is Hahm’s suggestion that the discussion should be
country-specific, for it is impractical to expect Confucianism to have the
same status and value among East Asian countries.16 Also, since the same
10

Shin-Yi Peng, The WTO Legalistic Approach and East Asia: From The Legal Culture
Perspective, 1 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 13, 21 (2000).
11
Chaihark Hahm, Law, Culture and the Politics of Confucianism, 16 COLUM. J. ASIAN L.
253, 270 (2003).
12
CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 145 (1977).
13
Sally E. Merry, Law, Culture, and Cultural Appropriation, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 575,
578 (1998).
14
Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term: Forward: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HARV. L. REV. 4, 4 (1983).
15
Hahm, supra note 11, at 268.
16
Id.
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Confucian influence can work in different ways depending on the concrete
issues involved, it is helpful to be issue-specific when discussing the
cultural underpinnings of certain laws.17
A. The Anti-Lawsuit Attitude
Particularly, Confucianists in ancient China emphasized the
importance of social harmony, which is still valued highly in
contemporary Taiwan.
In maintaining interpersonal harmony, the
Confucianist expressed disfavor towards resolving disputes via a lawsuit.
Confucius once said, “In hearing litigation, I am just like another man.
But I try always to eliminate the need for litigation[.]”18 Accordingly, the
Confucian regarded litigation as a last resort in resolving a dispute. This
anti-lawsuit attitude has been adopted by Chinese people for centuries and
thus provides fertile soil for the development of mediation. Through
mediation, disputants are allowed to seek solution to their conflict by
mutual compromise while still maintaining harmony.
Apart from the Confucian teachings on social harmony, Chinese
people also avoided lawsuits for various practical reasons. For one,
frequent delays often occurred and corruption in the system for
administration of justice was well-known. Besides, the courts were not
usually located at the site of disputes, thus it was very difficult for
peasants to petition the court due to the long distance of travel and the
time away from work.19 Lastly, the magistrates often were associated with
powerful local figures, which caused people to harbor distrust when
members of the powerful classes were involved in disputes.
B. Law as Punishment
Another factor that contributed to the prevalence of mediation is
the traditional Chinese concept of law as mainly punitive in nature. To
Chinese minds, the law was nothing more than the imposition of fines and
penalties for official transgression.20 Since law meant punishment, the
imperial law was in effect criminal law, with only a few provisions on
civil issues such as family, marriage, adoption, inheritance, property and
debts. The ancient Confucianists believed that an ideal society would

17

Id. at 268–69.
See Analects of Confucius, ch. XII, verse 13.
19
Jerome A. Cohen, Chinese Mediation on the Eve of Modernization, 54 CAL. L. REV.
1201, 1213 (1966).
20
WILLIAM H. MCNEILL & JEAN W. SEDLAR, CLASSICAL CHINA 76 (1960).
18
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never require extensive legislation or litigation, because the law was for
barbarians, not for a civilized society.21
Moreover, imperial China employed criminal punishment even for
civil disputes. All types of litigation, including marriage and property
issues, were subject to criminal procedures that included torture and
corporal punishment. As a result, being a party to a lawsuit was viewed as
involvement in a crime both in the judge’s and in society’s eyes.22 Since
people were treated in a humiliating manner in court, it was considered a
shame to be involved in a lawsuit and thus people inclined to settle
matters outside of the court, especially civil disputes.
C. Collectivism
Confucianism honors selfless righteous deeds and often contrasts
these with personal interests, which it labels trivial or less important.23 To
carry out righteous conduct, one must calculate profit not for oneself but
for the greater good. As a result, asserting one’s personal rights was
generally not encouraged by society. The traditional expectation of a
selfless individual became one of the obstacles to adoption of modern civil
litigation.
For Confucianists, the mutual obligation between the individual
and his family serve as powerful social control agent. The individual’s
responsibility to his family and the family’s responsibility to the
individual are interdependent. 24 This is in sharp contrast to western
individualism, and its emphasis on personal rights. Collectivism, which
emphasized group and communal goals, has been the norm for traditional
Chinese society.25 While individualist cultures consider placing personal
goals ahead of collective goals to be acceptable, in collectivist cultures it
is socially desirable to place collective goals ahead of personal goals.26
21

See DEREK BODDE & CLARENCE MORRIS, LAW IN IMPERIAL CHINA 21–22 (1973)
(discussing the idea that Confucianism always emphasized using reason to educate people
because ritual and education—rather than law—represented the most essential way to
attain social goals; moreover, education could prevent future wrongdoing, whereas law
only punished what had already happened, and therefore could only serve the limited
purpose of punishing evil but not of encouraging the good).
22
JIANFU CHEN, CHINESE LAW: CONTEXT AND TRANSFORMATION 12 (2008).
23
See Analects of Confucius, ch. IV, verse 23 (containing Confucius’s statement that “[a]
gentleman understands righteousness while a petty man understands profits”). See also id.
ch. XVII, verse 23 (“[A] gentleman who has courage but not righteousness will cause
disorder; a petty man who has courage but not righteousness will cause thievery.”).
24
Peng, supra note 10, at 24; REN XIN, TRADITION OF THE LAW AND LAW OF THE
TRADITION: LAW, STATE AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN CHINA 25–27 (1997).
25
BEE-CHEN GOH, NEGOTIATING WITH THE CHINESE 24–27 (1996).
26
Harry C. Triandis, Cross-Cultural Studies of Individualism and Collectivism, in
NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION 1989 (No. 37): CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES
42 (Richard A. Dienstbier & John J. Berman eds., 1990).
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As a typical example, a potential breakdown of marriage between
couples was not viewed as a personal matter.27 Rather, the dispute soon
became the pre-occupation of the two families, even the entire village or
community. Since divorce has been regarded as a disgrace throughout
history, every effort was directed at reconciliation of the marriage for the
purpose of safeguarding the reputation and social standing of the families.
Whether the couple still had feelings for each other was not the main
concern in the process of dispute resolution.
D. Family-Centered Ethics
The above discussion of cultural background leads us to a
discussion of how the concept of family shaped the traditional Chinese
way of dispute resolution. This view of interpersonal relationships was
demonstrated through the mode of differential association formulated by
the Chinese sociologist and anthropologist Hsiao-Tung Fei. According to
Fei, a Chinese society’s social pattern is like the different myriads of
ripples sent out by a stone thrown in the water. Everyone is situated in the
center of a circle created by one’s social connections, and those affected
by the ripples of the circle are also linked with each other.28 Among the
different circles, family plays an essential role and was regarded as the
most basic unit in Chinese society.29 Of the five “cardinal relationships”
advocated by Confucianists, three lie within the family: the relationships
between father and son, elder and younger brother, and husband and
wife.30
Filial piety is still emphasized in father-son relations in
contemporary China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore. To observe
filial piety, Confucius instructed, one must obey one’s parents without
complaining.31 This teaching also extends to other elders in the family
and the clan. The notion that a parent’s status was higher than that of a
child’s was embedded in state law throughout Chinese legal history.32 For

27

Michael Palmer, The Revival of Mediation in the People’s Republic of China, in
YEARBOOK ON SOCIALIST LEGAL SYSTEMS: 1987, at 250–51 (W. E. Butler ed., 1988).
28
Regarding the mode of differential association in Chinese interpersonal relationships,
see generally HSIAO-TUNG FEI, RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA: PERSPECT AND
RETROSPECT (1989).
29
Peng, supra note 10, at 24.
30
The remaining two could be viewed as an expansion of the other three: the lord-subject
relation was an extension of that of father and son, and the bond among friends grew out of
the connection between elder and younger brothers.
31
See Analects of Confucius, ch. IV, verse 18 (citing Confucius as saying, “[i]n serving
parents, make suggestions tactfully, and if your aspirations are not pursued, still respect
and do not disobey, bear burdens and do not complain”).
32
HWEI-SHIN CHEN, INDIVIDUAL, FAMILY, MARRIAGE AND THE STATE: RESEARCH AND
METHODOLOGY OF CHINESE LEGAL HISTORY 256–58 (2006).
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example, according to the Code of the T’ang Dynasty,33 parents were
entitled to give children corporal punishment, even after the offspring
reached their majority.34 If the parent’s chastisement caused the child’s
death, it was not viewed as a crime. But the child would face the
punishment of exile if it showed unfilial behavior toward the parents.
Moreover, a child which scolded its parents could be sentenced to death.35
As for relations among siblings, brothers are known in Chinese
terms as “hands and feet,” which means one is expected to love his or her
brothers as one’s own limbs. According to Confucianism, filial piety and
brotherhood are the fundamental elements of benevolence, the highest
moral standard of a gentleman. 36 Over the centuries these scriptural
guidelines—both positive and negative—have shaped people’s
expectations and behavior, which in turn influenced the Chinese way of
dealing with family disputes.37 For instance, the clan usually delegated to
its elders the role of arbitrating disputes because of their authority.38 Also,
one was expected to obey one’s eldest brother, while an eldest brother was
held accountable for the doings of his younger siblings.
In the eyes of traditional Chinese society, a wife’s social and legal
status was inferior to the husband’s; and one’s maternal relatives were less
important than their paternal counterparts. For example, grandparents on
the maternal side are called “external” (外, wai) grandparents in Chinese.
This is partly because in the patriarchal Chinese society, when a couple
gets married it is understood that the wife is joining the husband’s family,
rather than vice versa. According to the Code of the Imperial Ch’ing,
when the husband passed away inheritance of his estate passed on to his
son, not his widow.39 The unequal legal status of husband and the wife
was also demonstrated in laws on family violence. A woman could face
the death penalty if she dared to hit her husband, even if the husband
sustained no injury at all. On the contrary, only when a husband’s
violence severely injured the wife could the law intervene on her behalf.40
33

The T’ang Code (Tang Lü, 唐律), following the pattern of several earlier codes
(including the Sui-era Kaihuang Lü), described the “ten abominations”—or ten major vices
singled out for harsh punishment under law—which included plotting treason, the failure
to abide by filial piety, scolding parents or grandparents, and moving out of the family
home while parents or grandparents are still alive.
34
WANG, supra note 4, at 40.
35
Id. at 41.
36
See Analects of Confucius, ch. I, verse 2.
37
Charlotte Ikels, Introduction, in FILIAL PIETY: PRACTICE AND DISCOURSE IN
CONTEMPORARY EAST ASIA 3–4 (Charlotte Ikels ed., 2004).
38
Jin Zhan, Zhongguo Chuantong Tiaojie Zhidu de Yunxing Jizhi ji Qi Tedian [The
Mechanism and Characteristics of Ancient Chinese Mediation Systems], 18(4) JOURNAL OF
BEIJING INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION 38, 38–39 (2004).
39
TUNG-TSU CHU, CHUNG GUO FA LÜ YÜ CHUNG GUO SHE HUI [LAW AND SOCIETY IN
TRADITIONAL CHINA] 132–42 (1984).
40
Id.
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The dominant influence of Confucianism has been passed down to
each generation of Han Chinese in Taiwan, together with its anti-lawsuit
attitude, its notion of law as punishment, its collectivist ideals and outlook
and its family-centered ethics system. As a result, these concepts have
been preserved and practiced in Taiwan until the impact of the
Westernized law brought over by the Japanese colonial government and,
later on, the Nationalist government.

III. MEDIATION IN TAIWAN DURING JAPANESE COLONIAL TIMES:
1895–1945
The process of legal modernization in Taiwan began when Japan
gained control over Taiwan in 1895, as a result of its victory in the SinoJapanese War.41 During the Japanese occupation, the number of Japanese
in Taiwan was rather small, amounting to only 6% of the total population
in 1942, yet ruling over the remaining 94% of the population, comprised
mainly of Han Chinese and Taiwanese aboriginal tribes.42 By 1895, Japan
had completed its own modern codes, modeled on German laws of the late
nineteenth century. 43 However, due to Taiwanese armed resistance
against military takeover, in the beginning the Japanese government
adopted English colonial laws to rule this newly-acquired land.44 In other
words, modern Western law was first introduced to colonial Taiwan in late
nineteenth century, which is much earlier than the case in China. It should
be noted, however, that Japanese colonial government maintained the “old
customs” of the Han Chinese in dealing with family disputes. Later, in
1923, as the policy of cultural assimilation continued, Japan started to
extend its own laws to Taiwan, including civil codes, commercial codes
and many administrative laws and rules.45 “State law” in this article is
used to describe the positive law of the state, including legislation,
executive measures and judicial decisions, which have been the primary
way of imposing modern western laws on Taiwan.
As aforementioned, the Han Chinese who migrated from mainland
China carried with them the traditional Chinese legal culture which was
reinforced through the Code and rule of the imperial Ch’ing. As a result,
the Han Chinese population in Taiwan preferred to settle disputes out of
41

Taiwan was ceded to Japan in 1895 under the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, also
known as the Treaty of Maguan, signed by the representatives of Japanese government and
imperial Ching.
42
CHEN, supra note 8, at 96–97.
43
Dan F. Henderson, Law and Political Modernization in Japan, in POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT IN MODERN JAPAN 419–36 (Robert E. Ward ed., 1968).
44
Henry J. Lamley, Taiwan under Japanese Rule, 1895–1945: the Vicissitudes of
Colonialism, in TAIWAN: A NEW HISTORY 204–06 (Murry A. Rubinstein ed., 1999).
45
TAY-SHENG WANG, L EGAL R EFORM IN T AIWAN UNDER J APANESE C OLONIAL R ULE
1895–1945: T HE R ECEPTION OF W ESTERN L AW 52–55 (2000).
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court and via informal means. During the rule of the Ch’ing, there were
two types of mediation: clan mediation and local mediation. 46 Clan
mediation was presided over by “the elder and virtuous” of the clan, with
its legitimacy based on both state law and clan rules.47 Elders of a clan
were given the power to punish a member who violated their clan’s
rules. 48 Therefore, families and clans had significant influence in
Taiwanese dispute resolution. Leaders in the small local geographic
divisions called shiang pao were locally powerful and usually served as
mediators.49 Shiang pao were themselves responsible for the behavior of
the local populace and provided local resolution to disputes which erupted
within the district. This network of clan leaders and shiang pao often
overlapped, working hand in hand to ensure social order and harmony.
Under Japanese colonial rule, two kinds of mediation were
utilized for the purpose of local dispute resolution. One was known as
pao chia (保甲). The word pao was used standing alone to specify an
organization comprised of a hundred families, and chia to refer to 10
family units. The leaders of a pao chia were appointed and directed in
their role as agents of social control by Japanese police officers and thus
emerged as the new local leaders.50 A pao zhang, the leader of a pao, was
given the right to mediate simple civil issues; among them were the
division of family property and dissolution of marriage.
At the same time, civil disputes were also mediated by the chief of
the district government according to Han Chinese “old customs.”51 The
mediation under Japanese rule however, was very different from
traditional Chinese clan mediation or shiang pao. According to the 1904
Civil Disputes Mediation Law, a party who failed to be present at a
mediation faced visits to the police station and the imposition of a fine;
once a solution was reached by the parties, subsequent lawsuits were
forbidden and the mediated solution was enforced by the district
government.52 It is fair to conclude that the colonial government extended
its control through such district administrative mediation.
Initially influenced by the traditional Han Chinese anti-lawsuit
attitude, most disputants preferred mediation to litigation in colonial
46

See Jin, supra note 38, at 38.
See CHEN, supra note 8, at 96–97.
48
Id. at 39.
49
Shiang pao were sometimes also known as pao chia.
50
See Chiu-Fen Hung, Rizhi Chuqi Huludun Qu Baojia Shishi de Qingxing ji Baozheng
Juese de Tantao (1895–1909) [A Probe into the Paochia System and the Role of Paocheng in the Hulutun District during the Early Period of the Japanese Occupation (1895–
1909)], 34 JIN DAI SHI YAN JIU SUO JI KAN [BULLETIN OF THE INSTITUTE OF MODERN
HISTORY, ACADEMIA SINICA] 211, 258 (1990).
51
See Tay-Sheng Wang, The Legal Development of Taiwan in the 20th Century: Toward A
Liberal and Democratic Country, 11(3) PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 531, 557 (2002).
52
Id.
47
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Taiwan. In the early period of Japanese rule, administrative mediation
was very appealing due to its simple procedures and inexpensive fee
structure. 53 Moreover, the administrative mediator was given wide
discretion because civil courts had only few precedents at the time.54 In
fact, there were also other reasons which served to discourage people from
accessing the courts. From their own local perspective, Taiwanese
worried about Japanese officials’ unfamiliarity with native languages and
customs; while from the viewpoint of the Japanese colonial authorities,
they were reluctant to increase their monetary investment into the judicial
system of the colony and therefore sought to promote mediation as a
means of reducing the caseload of the courts.55
In the 1920s however Taiwanese people gradually became
accustomed to using modern courts to resolve civil disputes, and the
number of civil lawsuits eventually surpassed that of administrative
mediation.56 Partial reasons for this major transition may be found in the
increase of judicial staff and funding, general economic progress and the
growing prevalence of education among Taiwanese people.57 Another
reason for the trend may be found in the fact that civil litigation
precedents were expanding, and the wide discretion formerly enjoyed by
administrative mediators contracted because the scope of resolution was
limited by law and such precedents. Little by little, Taiwanese became
more familiar with modern court procedures, means of accessing the
justice system, and working with and through lawyers and notaries.58 The
more that Taiwanese reaffirmed that modern courts were able to protect
their interests and rights efficiently and at a reasonable cost, the more they
were likely to resort to litigation over mediation. This increasingly
positive attitude toward civil litigation intensified the extent of legal
transplantation of westernized Japanese laws and accelerated the
development of civil procedural laws in Taiwan.59
Although the Japanese legal system replaced the imperial Ch’ing
legal system in Taiwan, government-sanctioned practices concerning
family and inheritance survived the transition.60 The Japanese colonial
government found it more effective in governing their colonial society to
employ the existing infrastructure at the level of the family and local
community. Reinforcing the old Taiwanese customs not only kept society
53

See WANG, supra note 45, at 198.
Id.
55
Id. at 84–85.
56
Id. at 91–94.
57
Id. at 204–13.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 57.
60
See Tay-Sheng Wang, Bai Nian Lai Taiwan Falü de Xifanghua (The Westernization of
Taiwanese Legal System for One Hundred Years), in TAIWAN FALÜ SHI DE JIANLI (THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF TAIWANESE LEGAL HISTORY) 347–48 (1997).
54
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in order, but also reduced costs in law enforcement. Moreover, upholding
original social norms was a convenient way for Japan to uphold its own
legitimacy in the eyes of the Taiwanese people.61 In addition, family law
may not be as useful as criminal law or land law for purposes of social
control; nonetheless, it is so intimately related to social norms and
customs that it cannot be as easily changed by simply imposing new
laws.62
However, Japanese judges in colonial Taiwan did not adopt or
follow every old Taiwanese custom without submitting it to further
scrutiny. In adjudicating family disputes they applied Taiwanese customs
selectively. These judges were trained in Japan to employ westernized
Japanese laws and sometimes reinterpreted old Taiwanese customs.
Because part of the old customs were rejected or modified in this way,
courts in the Japanese colonial era played an essential role in shaping
Taiwanese family law.63 For example, according to the Han Chinese legal
practices and culture, a wife could only passively be divorced by her
husband and could not actively pursue a divorce; having no independent
legal standing, she was not allowed to file for a divorce by herself. In the
Japanese colonial courts, however, the custom was modified and
Taiwanese wives were given legal standing against their husbands in cases
of marriage dissolution.64 The Japanese judges’ initial goal may not have
been gender equality, but rather to make colonial Taiwan more “civilized”
and “modernized.”65 But via numerous and consistent judicial decisions,
this part of the old Taiwanese customs regarding family practice was
ultimately and irrevocably changed.

IV. MEDIATION IN THE NATIONALIST GOVERNMENT ERA: 1949–
PRESENT
After the defeat of Japan in World War II, Taiwan was
surrendered to Allied Forces in 1945. Later in 1949, Taiwan was acquired
by the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, “KMT”) after it was
overpowered by the Communist Party in mainland China, and
subsequently the KMT reestablished the Republic of China (ROC) in
61

See Li-Ju Lee, Law and Social Norms in A Changing Society: A Case Study of
Taiwanese Family Law, 8 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 413, 426 (1999).
62
Id. at 427.
63
See Chao-Ju Chen, Quanli, Falü Gaige yu Bentu Fu Yun [Rights, Legal Reform and
Local Women’s Movement], 62 CHENG TA FA HSUEH PING LUN [NATIONAL CHENGCHI
UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW] 25, 40–46 (1999).
64
See Chao-Ju Chen, Riben Shidai Taiwan Nüxing Lihun Quan de Xingcheng (the
Formation of Taiwanese Women’s Right to Divorce in Japanese Colonial Era), in TAIWAN
CHUNG TSENG JIN TAI HUA LUN WEN JIH [COLLECTION OF TAIWAN STRATIFIED
MODERNIZATION] 218–20 (M. Wakabayashi & M. Wu eds., 2000).
65
Id. at 220–29.
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T’aipei.66 By claiming to be the sole legitimate Chinese government, the
KMT identified itself as the advocate and true successor of Chinese
cultural tradition. For example, facing the destruction of Chinese culture
during the Cultural Revolution in Mainland China, the ROC government
initiated the Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement in 1967 to preserve
and promote traditional Chinese culture, and especially Confucianism.67
Between the 1920s and mid-1930s, when the KMT still controlled
mainland China, it followed the example of Meiji Japan by promulgating
German style codes as part of its efforts to unify the country and establish
a modern legal system.68 However, due to a state of recurrent war, the
new laws were never actually applied in mainland China. Only after the
1949 military retreat did the KMT have the opportunity to enforce the new
laws in Taiwan. It was a historical coincidence that the new codes
brought by KMT to Taiwan were actually modeled on Japanese laws, with
significant German influences. Based on the legacy of prior Japanese rule
in Taiwan, the ROC codes were easily implemented and followed. 69
During the 1960s and 1970s, the rapid economic development of Taiwan
facilitated the further expansion and progress of these civil and
commercial codes.70 To add to the diversity of legal transplantations,
American legal concepts were initially introduced to the Taiwanese people
in the midst of the Cold War, when the ROC government joined the
Western camp led by the US.71
After 1949, the number of lawsuits continued to grow due to the
process of urbanization.72 When people relocated to the cities for job
opportunities, they often had difficulty finding a well-respected mediator
66

Kuomintang, NEWWORLDENCYCLOPEDIA.ORG (Dec. 15, 2008, 2:40 PM),
http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/kuomintang#KMT_in_Taiwan
(“In
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China.”).
See also Party’s History, KUOMINTANG OFFICIAL WEBSITE,
http://www.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=para&mnum=108 (last visited June 9,
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which relates that on December 10, 1949, “[f]ollowing the government of the Republic of
China, the Kuomintang relocates to Taiwan . . . . [and] Party headquarters are set up at No.
11 Zhongshan South Road”).
67
Since 1967, Confucianism has been integrated into teaching materials for elementary
and middle school level in Taiwan. See Taiwan R.O.C. government information office
website, available at http://www.gio.gov.tw/info/taiwan-story/culture/down/3-3.htm (last
visited Jan. 20, 2010).
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who could be trusted by both parties. As a result, state authorities such as
courts were relied upon to solve civil disputes. The capitalistic economy
also raised complicated commercial disputes involving, for example,
issues of intellectual property that could only be decided by a court.73 In
other words, an agricultural economy and face-to-face interpersonal
relations used to form the foundation of mediation. Such a foundation has
been changed and transformed during the process of industrialization and
urbanization since the 1960s.74
The lifting of martial law in 1987 opened up a new era for legal
development in Taiwan. Echoing the political transformation toward
democracy, there have been strong demands for judicial reform in Taiwan.
According to Judicial Statistics, one of the factors that deterred people
from accessing the courts was the unreasonable delay involved in lawsuits,
which was caused by an understaffed judicial workforce and the heavy
caseload.75 Judicial reform is still an ongoing project in Taiwan. Mainly
carried out by lawyers and professors, groups such as the Foundation of
Judicial Reform have sought to revise laws to create a more transparent
judicial procedure, to improve courts’ demeanor and competence, and to
better protect human rights and access to justice.76
Among the boom in social movements since after 1987, child
welfare activists and women’s groups have advocated the rights of women
and children through the revision of Family Law.77 Taiwan’s Family Law
is contained in two separate parts of the Civil Code: the Division of
Relatives and the Division of Succession.78 Although Family Law in
Taiwan incorporated some modern ideas when first enacted in 1930, it
also upheld traditional patriarchal values and was criticized for
discriminating against women, disregarding child welfare and reinforcing
unequal gender roles.79 In response to the public pressure fostered by
activists and social groups, family law went through seven major
amendments from 1985 to 2007. The revision of the law coincided with
political changes, economic growth and development of women’s
73
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1138 to art. 1225 (Taiwan).
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movement in Taiwan.80 The new Family Law incorporated the principles
of gender equality and the best interests of the child, while emphasizing
the state’s role as guardian of disadvantaged family members in various
matters, such as those involving domestic violence. 81 The trend of
heightening state legal intervention in the family not only helps to break
down the boundary between the traditionally-separate public and private
spheres, but also provides a foundation and increased legitimacy for statesponsored family mediation.
A. Town Mediation
The Act of Town Mediation (hereinafter, the Act) was enacted in
1955 and most recently amended in 2007.82 Under the Act, a mediation
committee composed of seven to fifteen mediators is in charge of
mediating civil disputes as well as minor criminal cases.83 Different from
mediation under the Japanese occupation, which was generally
administrative in nature, town mediation after 1949 shows more profound
judicial influences. The control exercised by the judicial branch over this
mediation can be demonstrated in two ways: (i) the process of recruiting
mediators, and (ii) the judicial supervision of mediation.
Under the 2002 Amendment to the Act, potential mediators in a
particular township were initially to be nominated to a pool by the town
administrative chief, and then elected to their positions by the township’s
Representative Assembly.84 To further cultivate mediator impartiality,
after 2005 neither administrative heads nor current members of the
legislature were to be allowed to join a mediation committee.85 Moreover,
if a dispute involved the mediator or his family, the mediator was to
recuse himself from the particular mediation upon the request of a
disputant.86 Furthermore, the power to decide on town mediators was then
to be transferred from the Representative Assembly to the trial court or the
district attorney’s office nearest to the town. 87 Since local powerful
80

Yuan-Chen Lee, How the Feminist Movement Won Media Space in Taiwan:
Observation by A Feminist Activist, in SPACES OF THEIR OWN: WOMEN’S PUBLIC SPHERE IN
TRANSNATIONAL CHINA 95–113 (Mayfair Mei-Hui Yang ed., 1999).
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Li-Ju Lee, Fabu Ru Jiamen? Jiashifa Yanbian De Falu: Shehuixiao Fenxi [Between the
State and the Family—A Study of Recent Taiwanese Family Law Development], 10
ZHONGYUAN CAIJING FAXIAO [CHUNG YUAN FIN. & ECON. L. REV.] 41, 83 (2003).
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See Taiwan Ministry of Justice, Database of Law, available at
http://law.moj.gov.tw/Scripts/Query4A.asp?FullDoc=all&Fcode=I0020003 (last visited
July 23, 2010).
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figures often occupy administrative and legislative positions in the
townships, the 2002 Amendment also aims to reduce potential conflicts of
interest by setting limitations on who may participate in mediation
committees. Besides their power to decide upon town mediators, trial
courts possess the power to review settlements made at the town level to
see whether they are consistent with existing law.88 Once confirmed by a
judge, the settlement receives legal status making it automatically
enforceable, and disputants are enjoined from launching subsequent
litigation on the decided matter.89 This binding effect is similar to that of
administrative mediations conducted during the Japanese colonial period.
According to statistics provided by Taiwan’s Ministry of the
Interior, cases of town mediation have increased from around 45,000 in
1991 to 112,000 in 2008.90 Apparently, urbanization and industrialization
have not been responsible for this rise in the overall number of mediated
cases, as they have with litigation. The nature of disputes leading to an
increased caseload has in either case been different. The statistics indicate
that the number of civil mediation cases has not changed much since 1995,
whereas criminal mediation cases have grown tremendously. Since 2003,
the number of criminal cases has surpassed civil ones. According to the
latest data, among all the cases which were submitted to town mediation
during 2008, only about 43% were civil cases, while 57% were criminal
cases.91 One field study pointed out that the notable increase of traffic
accidents during this period actually accounts for the boost to town
mediation figures.92
Although town mediation in Taiwan seems to be modernized,
some aspects of the system still show traces of Confucian thought. For
example, mediators tend to be mostly elder males. In fact, prior to 2005
more than 85% of mediators were male.93 It was not until 2005—when
cases involving domestic violence were on the rise—that a new provision
was added to the Act, proclaiming that one fourth of mediator positions
were henceforth to be reserved for female mediators.94 As a result in 2008
the overall percentage of male mediators dropped to 72%, but they still
comprise 78% of mediators over fifty years of age. 95 This common
88
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practice is consistent with Confucian teachings on gender roles and the
respect due to elders.
One commentator has pointed out that many town mediators
consider mediation as a forum in which to reach a compromise and avoid
litigation, restoring social harmony, a concept closely related to the
Confucian tradition. 96 Taiwanese society is still a relationship-driven
society composed of primary and secondary interpersonal relationships.97
Since the maintenance of relationships, or guan shi, is more important
than questions of actual right and wrong, fairness must be judged in the
context of such social relations instead of according to strict justice under
the law.98 If a mediator happens to be an acquaintance of a disputant, his
relatives or his friends, the mediator will often appeal to mutual relations
or guan shi as part of reaching a settlement. Furthermore, some disputants
have been asked to perform a favor of benevolence, or jen ch’ing, on
behalf of an elder mediator, by thinking of the situation from the opposite
party’s perspective and achieving conciliation. The concept of jen ch’ing
is a mutually-recognized social obligation, crucial to maintaining the
“face” of both mediator and disputants.
B. Court Mediation
Statistics show that court mediation in Taiwan is increasing
because of legal reforms, but has been relatively less used and less
efficient, when compared to town mediation. Specifically, the 1999
amendment of the Civil Procedure Law ordained eleven types of civil
cases as being obligated to undergo mandatory mediation before
proceeding to litigation, including property and family disputes.99 Even at
the litigation stage, the two parties may, upon agreement, suspend the
lawsuit and restart court mediation.100 The new law has resulted in the
increase of court mediation from about 47,000 cases in 1999 to 81,000 in
2008, though that figure is still much less than the figure for cases
mediated through town mediation. 101 The percentage of successfully
mediated cases is also low: only around 14% were successful in 1999, but
this grew to 47% in 2007.102 On the other hand, civil lawsuits handled by
96
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Taiwan’s district courts amounted to 1.37 million cases in 1998,
increasing to 2.81 million cases in 2008, which is altogether far higher
than the number of cases resolved by court mediation and town mediation
combined. 103 On the whole, Taiwanese people are showing more
inclination to use litigation to address disputes, which is rather consistent
with their behavior during the late Japanese colonial period.
Court mediation is not conducted directly by judges, but rather by
a panel of one to three mediators appointed by the court.104 If the dispute
is not settled, the process of litigation resumes and neither statements
made nor any compromises agreed to during the mediation phase may be
used as the foundation of a later judicial decision.105 The advantage of
such a distinction is procedural justice, because the judge’s opinion is not
contaminated by a party’s statement made during court mediation. One
potential disadvantage of the court mediation model is that it creates
unnecessary structural and procedural overlaps with town mediation, as a
result of the fact that pools of mediators are shared between the two
systems.
The above disadvantage could be partly alleviated by the latest
developments in family mediation. The new system recruits licensed
experts, such as social workers, to conduct family mediations and to assist
divorcing couples in post-divorce arrangements, including custody issues,
alimony and child support.106 The legal reform was inspired by the work
of the Child Welfare League Foundation (hereinafter, the Foundation), a
non-profit organization dedicated to advocating children’s rights for the
purpose of raising awareness of child welfare issues in Taiwan.107 In the
process of a divorce, children’s interests are often overlooked. The two
ways of applying for a divorce in Taiwan are argued to exacerbate the
situation of children involved. Divorce by mutual consent is extremely
simple, requiring only the submission of a written form with two parties’
and two witnesses’ signatures, and the completion of a household
registration procedure.108 Children’s rights are left to negotiation between
parents because court supervision is not required in this type of divorce.
In contrast to the scenario where there is mutual consent, divorce through
103
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litigation is a a rather tough process, in which the party wishing to divorce
must meet a high evidentiary bar. That party must use concrete and
legally-accessed evidence to demonstrate the other party’s adultery, use of
violence, or abandonment.109 In the process of such divorce litigation,
emphasis is placed on the issue of whether a divorce can be granted, and
not on the best interests of the child in the post-divorce setting.
In this context, the Foundation first introduced family conciliation
in 1996, and after several years of advocacy and preparation began to
provide consultation services for divorcing couples in 2002.110 Due to the
increase in divorce cases and the highly emotional setting of family
mediation, it is necessary for a trained mediator to assist the two parties in
reaching an agreement that considers the child’s best interests as well as
the needs of the parents. A few judges responded to the Foundation’s
efforts by promoting family mediation in their courts.111 In 2005, the
Judicial Yuan launched a family mediation pilot project in six district
courts, and in 2008 promoted this to every family court in Taiwan.
The non-adversarial approach of using mediation is considered
appropriate for resolving family disputes, because most disputants either
live in the same household or need to cooperate with each other in caring
for children. To resolve disputes and to restore harmony to families,
family courts recruit experts such as psychotherapists, lawyers and social
workers to work with the disputants. If domestic violence is involved,
mediation is not allowed unless the mediator has been trained to handle
such cases or the victim is accompanied by a supportive person. 112
Interestingly, each family court has developed a model of family
mediation which differs slightly from that of its peers. For example, in
T’aipei District Court, two mediators usually meet with each of their
respective parties separately, and only proceed to a meeting of both
disputants and mediators to decide the matter with the two parties’
consent.113 In T’aichung District Court, however, parties do not have
separate mediators but both are required to be present in the meeting with
the mediator. 114 Still, judges are the ultimate supervisors of family
mediation and are responsible for choosing suitable mediators according
to th nature and type of the family dispute.
Compared to the mediators who conduct town mediation, the
mediators in court mediation generally have a higher level of education
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and more opportunities to partake in specialized training programs.115 The
facilities that courts provide to such mediation—both physical, such as the
mediation room, and otherwise, such as legal assistance—are also much
superior than those available at the township level. Nevertheless, there are
emerging challenges that such family mediation must face. The process of
providing counseling services, especially where those are provided by
mediators who are simultaneously psychotherapists and social workers,
should remain confidential so as to comply with professional ethics.
Mediators should not be required nor asked to reveal details concerning
their mediation, so that the judge will not be biased if later the case is to
be litigated. However, since judges have the power to supervise and to
give instructions, there are potential professional conflicts between the
judge and the court-appointed mediator. Currently, there are no standard
rules or operating procedures concerning what kind of information may
and may not be revealed to the judge during the mediation, because the
new system has only lately been implemented. One potential consequence
of not having unified and clear guidelines on this matter could be that the
two parties will not feel comfortable or safe to speak to mediators for fear
of making the inevitable disclosure to the judge, and the goal of mediation
would in this case not be met.

V. INTERACTIONS BETWEEN STATE LAW AND TRADITIONAL
CHINESE LEGAL CULTURE
Taiwan has adopted western legal thoughts and codes since the
Japanese military takeover in late nineteenth century. Meanwhile, the
Taiwanese people’s experiences of dispute resolution continue to be
influenced by traditional Chinese legal culture. Even though the state law
is now completely westernized, the long-lasting legal tradition still has
power over how law is interpreted and enforced. Law scholars and
practitioners in Taiwan have encountered the dilemma of how to reconcile
state law with Confucian tradition. In other words, when the “law on the
books” is not identical to the “law in action,” how might this discrepancy
impact and transform the system of dispute resolution? Would the official
state law simply become ineffective due to a problem of enforceability?
Or would the construction of traditional legal culture be gradually
changed?
As a Chinese society that underwent Japanese colonial rule and a
process of legal transplantation, Taiwan’s law flows from multiple sources
115
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and exhibits legal pluralism. Legal pluralism is generally defined as a
situation in which two or more legal systems coexist in the same social
field.116 In his pioneering work on “legal levels,” Pospisil claims that
“every functioning subgroup in society has its own legal system which is
necessarily different in some respects from those of the other
subgroups.” 117 By “subgroups” he means sub-units such as family,
lineage and community that are integral parts of a homogenous society.
Early studies of legal pluralism examine indigenous legal ways among
tribal and village people in colonial Asia, Africa, and the Pacific. 118
Tribes and villages had developed some law over generations, on to which
western law was then imposed by the European colonial powers. The
imposed law, forged in a state of industrial capitalism rather than an
agrarian way of life, embodied very different principles and procedures.
Before the Japanese military takeover in 1895, Taiwan was ruled
by the imperial Ch’ing for more than two centuries. The code of the
imperial Ch’ing was the state law of Taiwan during that period, and was
deeply influenced by Confucian ideas of dispute resolution.119 Brought by
Han Chinese immigrants to Taiwan, the Confucian tradition incorporated
the notions of an anti-lawsuit attitude, law as punishment, a collectivist
ideal or outlook and family-centered ethics—and melded these into the
day-to-day life of Taiwanese people. When Japanese colonial power
further brought German-style laws and a modern court system to Taiwan,
representing the western ideals of individualism and of legal rights, the
consequence of this was that a plurality of legal orders was created.
For a society like Taiwan, however, the existence of legal
pluralism is itself of less interest than the relationship between Japanese
colonial law and the Confucian legal tradition. On many occasions, state
law may be utilized as a competent tool for the modernization of Third
World countries.120 For example, leaders of many post-colonial societies
often regard their traditional legal system as messy and obstructive to
116
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progress, and therefore draw on the power of state law to reshape the
social order. 121 As post-colonial societies endeavor to adopt more
“civilized” state law for the purpose of modernization, however, they meet
with intense resistance from those groups whose law has been preserved
in some fashion.122 This is partly because new laws are thrust upon going
social arrangements in which there are complexes of binding obligations
already in existence.123 The social arrangements are often effectively
stronger than the new laws.
During the Japanese colonial period, mediators no longer tended
to be elders of clans or respected local figures, but were individuals
appointed by the district governments or by Japanese police officers. At
the same time, the Han Chinese “old customs” continued to be applied in
both civil mediation and litigation. Since traditional Chinese legal culture
was so deeply rooted in the minds of the Han Chinese populace, the
preservation of certain customs helped to uphold the legitimacy of the
Japanese rule and reduced resistance to it from the ruled class. In the
course of this dialectical, mutually-constitutive interaction between state
law and Chinese legal tradition, customs regarding family and succession
became part of the state law through selective application by the colonial
courts. After 1920, Taiwanese became more familiar with modern court
procedures and learned to work with lawyers.124 In this context, some
traditional Chinese legal culture was gradually changed. For example, the
traditional belief that a wife had no separate legal standing was modified
because colonial courts afforded Taiwanese women legal standing against
their husbands in cases of marriage dissolution.125 Although Taiwanese
women were often powerless in settings of private negotiation, they were
nevertheless empowered by such colonial court practices and thus became
more willing to resort to litigation. In this case, instead of revolutionary
changes, there was a gradual transformation in women’s access to the
courts to address family problems.
After the ROC government retreated to Taiwan in 1949, a second
westernized legal system—modeled this time after both German and
Japanese law—was brought to Taiwan. Compared to town mediation,
121
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however, the number of lawsuits continued to grow after this point
because of urbanization and the relocation caused by industrialization.126
In disputes over family and succession issues, for example, the 2008
statistics show that the number of litigated cases was around 12 times
greater than cases under town mediation.127
Mediation by experts in family courts, which has been adopted in
Taiwan since 2008, is a new experiment aimed to reduce the cost of
litigation and tailor results better to disputants’ needs. Because family
court mediation has only just been implemented in Taiwan recently,
studies on this new kind of court mediation are still in their infancy.
Nevertheless, Taiwan has adopted westernized law for more than a
century since 1895. Have long-existing Confucian views about family
harmony and interpersonal relationships died away? Or do these still play
a part in mediators’ approach to resolving family disputes? More
empirical studies will be required to learn more about court mediators’
state of mind and their views about certain traditional Chinese values.
One quantitative study that explored the ethical conception and
behavior of mediators from 17 family courts in Taiwan provides some
insight on the above questions. First of all, the study indicated that 53%
of mediators tended to counsel against divorce for the sole purpose of
maintaining family harmony, while 47% had never done so.128 It also
discovered other intriguing facts, such as the following: in mediating
family disputes, 55% of mediators often or sometimes suggested that a
wife who refused to live with her husband’s parents was morally wrong,
while 45% never made such a suggestion; 52.3% advised that women
working outside of homes were still responsible for most household
chores, while only 47.7% reported never having said so.129 Even in the
context of domestic violence, 48.3% of mediators have at least once told a
wife that physical violence was not a serious matter; and 49.4% have
expressed the opinion that a husband’s constant use of swearwords
towards his wife did not constitute abuse, and therefore should be
tolerated.130
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See Judicial Yuan, Difang Fayuan Jiashi Shijian Shoujie Jianshu Yi An Nian Biefen [地
方 法 院 家 事 事 件 收 結 件 數 一 按 年 別 分 ],
http://www.judicial.gov.tw/juds/year97/09/021.pdf (last visited May 8, 2010). See also
Taiwan Ministry of the Interior, Summary of Mediation Services Conducted [辦理調解業
務概況], http://sowf.moi.gov.tw/stat/year/y01-09.xls (last visited May 8, 2010).
128
Hsiao, supra note 113, at 162 (providing statistics from a study that revealed how 53%
of mediators advised against divorce in order to maintain familial harmony).
129
Id. at 170–72 (providing statistics demonstrating that 55% of mediators have suggested
that a wife is morally wrong for refusing to live with her husband’s parents).
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Judging from above statistics, although court mediators in Taiwan
tend to be better-educated and more professionally advanced than their
town mediator peers, they may still be subject to a strong influence from
certain patriarchal ideas embedded in Taiwan’s traditional culture. One
idea, for instance, is the Confucian principle of maintaining family
harmony at any cost—and often at the cost of a woman making her own
choices about her life, as well as the principle of gender equality, and even
personal safety. A similar study has not yet been carried out for town
mediation, which still awaits a future survey. The above study did
indicate, however, that mediator gender and age were the most statistically
significant variables insofar as their attitude towards gender equality was
concerned.131 Specifically, female mediators and mediators under the age
of sixty years displayed far greater awareness of ethical behavior and so
did those mediators under sixty years old.132

VI. CONCLUSION
The legal operation of dispute resolution can be viewed as a
continuum, with private negotiation between disputants at one end and
litigation on the other. Between the two ends are: mediation within a clan,
town mediation, and court mediation. From informal private settlement to
formal judicial decision, the influence of Confucian teaching generally
declines while the control of the law tightens. Traditionally, Taiwanese
people have preferred to settle civil and family disputes outside of courts
and through informal means, due to the continuing influence of traditional
Chinese legal culture. The modern town mediation, which is derived from
the German civil procedure laws, however, is different from traditional
mediation in many ways. For example, traditional clan or town mediation
is a private way of resolving disputes, while modern town mediation has
been controlled by either township officers—in Japanese colonial times
and the early Nationalist government era—or alternately the courts, which
are responsible for supervising it at present. As for in-court mediation, it
is modeled on western laws and therefore it has no parallel in traditional
Taiwanese society.
In the context of Taiwan’s legal modernization, this article
examined the history and evolution of civil mediation in Taiwan from the
beginning of the Japanese colonial era in 1895, up to 2008 when the new
system of family court mediation was implemented to every district court
in Taiwan. Traditional Chinese culture is not entirely compatible with
westernized state law first adopted by the Japanese colonial government.
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However, because of the increase in judicial staff and funding required,
the progress of economic development and the growing prevalence of
education among Taiwanese people, a major transition has occurred over
this period and gradually, Taiwanese have reached the point where they
resort to courts more often than they will to mediation.133 This inclination
to engage in civil litigation has continued to grow during the Nationalist
government era beginning in 1949.
However, the new westernized state law and Chinese tradition
have not always been mutually exclusive. The dynamics of change and
transformation between legal orders holds especially true in the area of
family issues. On the one hand, Taiwan’s current family law was enacted
in 1930 with German law influences that emphasized individualism,
personal rights and gender equality. On the other, the traditional Chinese
values of collectivism, interpersonal harmony, and patriarchy continue to
affect the way in which law is interpreted and enforced in Taiwan. Setting
aside the “state-law-versus-custom” dichotomy, this ever-evolving process
of dialectic, resistance and melding between different legal orders shows
no signs of abatement, and will continue to affect life and legal practice in
Taiwan.
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